Graphic showing NYT / Siena College poll toplines
A screenshot of toplines selected by the editors of the New York Times to accompany Shane Goldmacher's reporting (Screenshot)

In part­ner­ship with Siena Col­lege, The New York Times recent­ly sur­veyed vot­ers in six key swing states about the 2024 pres­i­den­tial elec­tion, which is one year away. (Gen­er­al Elec­tion Day in 2024 will be on Tues­day, Novem­ber 5th).

The NYT and Siena found Don­ald Trump — who has been charged with incit­ing an insur­rec­tion against the Unit­ed States — ahead of Pres­i­dent Joe Biden in five out of the six states, with Biden hold­ing onto a nar­row lead only in Wisconsin:

The results show Mr. Biden los­ing to Mr. Trump, his like­li­est Repub­li­can rival, by mar­gins of four to ten per­cent­age points among reg­is­tered vot­ers in Ari­zona, Geor­gia, Michi­gan, Neva­da and Penn­syl­va­nia. Mr. Biden is ahead only in Wis­con­sin, by two per­cent­age points, the poll found.

These are state-lev­el polls in key swing states where the 2024 pres­i­den­tial elec­tion is expect­ed to be decid­ed, so they are worth scru­ti­niz­ing, unlike the nation­al polls that don’t offer a whole lot of val­ue. Here are some thoughts from our team after review­ing the poll results that the NYT pub­lished. (We were much more inter­est­ed in the data they shared than their take on it.)

Republican voters were oversampled in these polls

The word “over­sam­pled” does­n’t appear in either Shane Gold­macher’s write­up of the poll results or Nate Cohn’s write­up. How­ev­er, if you open the actu­al dataset, look through it, and read the end­notes, a key fact should become imme­di­ate­ly appar­ent: Repub­li­can vot­ers were over­sam­pled in these polls.

It’s irre­spon­si­ble of the NYT to not state this upfront in all of its cov­er­age. This is an impor­tant design choice that they made, and it ought to be explained.

The New York Times and its part­ners had to do a bunch of weight­ing because of their deci­sion to do over­sam­pling. Here is their expla­na­tion, which is only in the end­notes, not in any of the sto­ries they’ve writ­ten so far about the poll. It’s long:

Weight­ing — reg­is­tered voters

The sur­vey was weight­ed by The Times using the R sur­vey pack­age in mul­ti­ple steps to account for the over­sam­ple of Repub­li­can voters.

First, the sam­ples were adjust­ed for unequal prob­a­bil­i­ty of selec­tion by stratum.

Sec­ond, the six state sam­ples were weight­ed sep­a­rate­ly to match vot­er file-based para­me­ters for the char­ac­ter­is­tics of reg­is­tered vot­ers by state.

The fol­low­ing tar­gets were used:

  • Par­ty (par­ty reg­is­tra­tion if avail­able, else clas­si­fi­ca­tion based on a mod­el of vote choice in pri­or Times/Siena polls)
  • Age (Self-report­ed age, or vot­er file age if the respon­dent refuses)
  • Gen­der (L2 data)
  • Race or eth­nic­i­ty (L2 model)
  • Edu­ca­tion (four cat­e­gories of self-report­ed edu­ca­tion, weight­ed to match NYT-based tar­gets derived from Times/Siena polls, cen­sus data and the L2 vot­er file)
  • Mar­i­tal sta­tus (L2 model)
  • Home own­er­ship (L2 model)
  • State regions (NYT clas­si­fi­ca­tions by coun­ty or city)
  • Turnout his­to­ry (NYT clas­si­fi­ca­tions based on L2 data)
  • Vote method in the 2020 elec­tions (NYT clas­si­fi­ca­tions based on L2 data)
  • Cen­sus block group den­si­ty (A.C.S. 5‑Year Cen­sus Block Group data)
  • City type (Neva­da only, added based on a post-hoc analy­sis of the dif­fer­ence between the weight­ed sam­ple and vot­er file para­me­ters. The weight had no mean­ing­ful effect on the topline result.)
  • Cen­sus tract edu­ca­tion­al attain­ment (Geor­gia only, added based on a post-hoc analy­sis of the dif­fer­ence between the weight­ed sam­ple and vot­er file para­me­ters. The weight had no mean­ing­ful effect on the topline result.)

Final­ly, the six state sam­ples were bal­anced to each rep­re­sent one-sixth of the sum of the weights.

Weight­ing — like­ly electorate

The sur­vey was weight­ed by The Times using the R sur­vey pack­age in mul­ti­ple steps to account for the over­sam­ple of Repub­li­can voters.

First, the sam­ples were adjust­ed for unequal prob­a­bil­i­ty of selec­tion by stratum.

Sec­ond, the first-stage weight was adjust­ed to account for the prob­a­bil­i­ty that a reg­is­trant would vote in the 2024 elec­tion, based on a mod­el of turnout in the 2020 election.

Third, the six state sam­ples were weight­ed sep­a­rate­ly to match tar­gets for the com­po­si­tion of the like­ly elec­torate. The tar­gets for the com­po­si­tion of the like­ly elec­torate were derived by aggre­gat­ing the indi­vid­ual-lev­el turnout esti­mates described in the pre­vi­ous step for reg­is­trants on the L2 vot­er file. The cat­e­gories used in weight­ing were the same as those pre­vi­ous­ly men­tioned for reg­is­tered voters.

Fourth, the ini­tial like­ly elec­torate weight was adjust­ed to incor­po­rate self-report­ed vote inten­tion. The final prob­a­bil­i­ty that a reg­is­trant would vote in the 2024 elec­tion was four-fifths based on their ex ante mod­eled turnout score and one-fifth based on their self-report­ed inten­tion, based on pri­or Times/Siena polls, includ­ing a penal­ty to account for the ten­den­cy of sur­vey respon­dents to turn out at high­er rates than non­re­spon­dents. The final like­ly elec­torate weight was equal to the mod­eled elec­torate rake weight, mul­ti­plied by the final turnout prob­a­bil­i­ty and divid­ed by the ex ante mod­eled turnout probability.

Final­ly, the six state sam­ples were bal­anced to each rep­re­sent one-sixth of the sum of the weights.

The NPI team did not see an expla­na­tion giv­en for why Repub­li­can vot­ers were over­sam­pled, but we can guess why. It is under­stand­able that the New York Times and Siena don’t want to make the mis­take of under­es­ti­mat­ing Trump’s sup­port, giv­en some of the issues that have plagued polling in pre­vi­ous cycles.

If one of the news­pa­per’s research objec­tives was to do a deep dive into Repub­li­can vot­ers’ views on the 2024 pres­i­den­tial race and key issues, then it would have made more sense, in our view, to do a sep­a­rate research project focus­ing exclu­sive­ly on Repub­li­can vot­ers, even if would cost more.

Just how few progressive or partially progressive voters are in the sample? The percentages may surprise you

Most of the NYT’s cov­er­age so far has focused on how Demo­c­ra­t­ic and Demo­c­ra­t­ic lean­ing respon­dents feel about Joe Biden’s reelec­tion, as opposed to how Repub­li­can vot­ers feel about Don­ald Trump or anoth­er Repub­li­can seek­ing the nom­i­na­tion, such as Ron DeSan­tis or Nik­ki Haley.

The crosstabs for these polls show that 75% of the respon­dents iden­ti­fy as very con­ser­v­a­tive, some­what con­ser­v­a­tive, or “mod­er­ate” (which isn’t an ideology):

QUESTION: Do you con­sid­er your­self polit­i­cal­ly lib­er­al, mod­er­ate, or conservative?

FOLLOW UP: (If lib­er­al or con­ser­v­a­tive) Is that very or somewhat?


  • Very lib­er­al: 10%
  • Some­what lib­er­al: 10%
  • Mod­er­ate: 39%
  • Some­what con­ser­v­a­tive: 19%
  • Very con­ser­v­a­tive: 17%
  • Don’t know/Refused: 5%

Poll­sters can’t know who is actu­al­ly going to show up and vote next year, so they have to con­struct mod­els to project what the uni­verse of par­tic­i­pat­ing vot­ers might be. And, as men­tioned above, Repub­li­can vot­ers were over­sam­pled — on pur­pose. This required the NYT and its part­ners to do a bunch of weighting.

A whop­ping four-fifths of the total sam­ple said they con­sid­er them­selves some­thing oth­er than lib­er­al, or refused to answer. 39% iden­ti­fied as “mod­er­ate” — a label that sounds good but does­n’t stand for any­thing — and 36% iden­ti­fied as con­ser­v­a­tive, near­ly twice as many as those who said liberal.

Now, here are the par­ty affil­i­a­tion numbers:

QUESTION: Do you con­sid­er your­self a Demo­c­rat, a Repub­li­can, an inde­pen­dent or a mem­ber of anoth­er party?


  • Democra: 30%
  • Repub­li­can: 32%
  • Inde­pen­dent: 30%
  • Anoth­er part: 4%
  • Don’t know / refused: 5%

FOLLOW-UP QUESTION: (If inde­pen­dent, anoth­er par­ty, or don’t know on par­ti­san­ship) And as of today, do you lean more to:


  • The Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty: 38%
  • The Repub­li­can Par­ty: 44%
  • Don’t know / refused: 18%

COMBINED ANSWERS: Par­ty iden­ti­fi­ca­tion and leaners

  • The Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty: 45%
  • The Repub­li­can Par­ty: 49%
  • Don’t know/Refused: 7%

The deci­sion to over­sam­ple Repub­li­cans and use weight­ing to account for that result­ed in a more com­plex pub­lic opin­ion research project — one that is hard­er to eval­u­ate and scru­ti­nize. The NYT’s reporters and ana­lysts should have stat­ed upfront in their analy­sis that Repub­li­cans were oversampled.

They did­n’t. That’s unacceptable.

Penn­syl­va­nia, Neva­da, Geor­gia, Ari­zona, Wis­con­sin, and Michi­gan are all swing states where either par­ty can win. Recent elec­tions — in 2022, 2020, 2018, and 2016 — have demon­strat­ed this. The New York Times’ news­room and data team thought Repub­li­cans would be very dom­i­nant in the midterms, as we doc­u­ment­ed right here on The Cas­ca­dia Advo­cate a lit­tle over a year ago.

But the red wave that the NYT’s peo­ple thought was com­ing did not mate­ri­al­ize. Repub­li­cans did just well enough to get a slim major­i­ty in the U.S. House but failed to flip the Sen­ate. Repub­li­cans lost guber­na­to­r­i­al races in four of the six swing states men­tioned above (Penn­syl­va­nia, Ari­zona, Wis­con­sin, and Michi­gan) as well as con­trol of the Leg­is­la­ture in Michi­gan and the Penn­syl­va­nia House.

It should be not­ed that the New York Times and Siena Col­lege have a decent rep­u­ta­tion. For instance, their WA-08 polling in 2018 was on the mark, show­ing slight leads for Demo­c­ra­t­ic hope­ful Kim Schri­er (who won), while local firm Elway Research got it wrong, find­ing a sig­nif­i­cant lead for Dino Rossi (who lost).

But even if this polling is on the mark and does reflect the cur­rent dynam­ics, it’s vital to remem­ber the old say­ing that polls are snap­shots in time. They are not pre­dic­tive, and can’t be. At best, they can be sug­ges­tive, but the data can only be use­ful if the ques­tions are neu­tral and the sam­ples prop­er­ly representative.

We can’t know if the weight­ed sam­ples in these bat­tle­ground state polls reflect the elec­torate that’ll turn out next year. Our team does­n’t think it’s pos­si­ble to make even an edu­cat­ed guess about who’ll show up at this junc­ture, not even with the best avail­able soft­ware, sources of data, and poll design expertise.

Speak­ing of prob­lem­at­ic media coverage…

The mass media is failing Americans at an incredibly critical juncture for American democracy

Amer­i­ca is a coun­try of over 335 mil­lion peo­ple — the third most pop­u­lous in the world after India and Chi­na. There’s no way that any U.S. pres­i­dent can have per­son­al rela­tion­ships with even a mil­lionth of the peo­ple that they rep­re­sent. What Amer­i­cans see and hear about the Biden-Har­ris admin­is­tra­tion is there­fore deter­mined in large part by the mass media, which nowa­days has very con­cen­trat­ed own­er­ship, mean­ing just a few com­pa­nies own most of the media.

By any objec­tive stan­dard, much of the media is doing a ter­ri­ble, awful, hor­ri­ble job of cov­er­ing pol­i­tics and keep­ing Amer­i­cans informed about what real­ly mat­ters. Folks like James Fal­lows and Jay Rosen reg­u­lar­ly point this out. Polit­i­cal cov­er­age has become very shal­low and rat­ings dri­ven, writ­ten by reporters look­ing pri­mar­i­ly through the prism of who’s win­ning and who’s los­ing. Sen­sa­tion­al­ism is in, sub­stance is out — and it’s been that way for a long time.

We can see the con­se­quences of the fourth estate’s descent into absur­di­ty in these poll results. Con­sid­er the fol­low­ing set of ques­tions and respons­es from the poll, which ask about Biden and Trump’s policies:

QUESTION: Do you think Joe Biden’s poli­cies have helped you per­son­al­ly or hurt you personally?


  • Helped: 35%
  • Hurt: 53%
  • Don’t know/Refused: 12%


  • Helped: 32%
  • Hurt: 53%
  • Don’t know/Refused: 14%

QUESTION: Do you think Don­ald Trump’s poli­cies have helped you per­son­al­ly or hurt you personally?


  • Helped: 51%
  • Hurt: 34%
  • Don’t know/Refused: 14%


  • Helped: 52%
  • Hurt: 32%
  • Don’t know/Refused: 16%

53% of respon­dents said Biden’s poli­cies have hurt them. That’s objec­tive­ly non­sen­si­cal: Biden has request­ed from Con­gress and signed into law a long list of bills to help most Amer­i­cans. For exam­ple, the Infla­tion Reduc­tion Act is final­ly allow­ing Medicare to nego­ti­ate the price of pre­scrip­tion drugs. The Amer­i­can Res­cue Plan reduced child pover­ty with the Child Tax Cred­it. The admin­is­tra­tion is using its author­i­ty under exist­ing law to try to for­give stu­dent loan debt.

And so on.

But oth­er polling has showed Amer­i­cans sim­ply don’t know about these things.

In the absence of that knowl­edge, vot­ers are draw­ing con­clu­sions based on what is being said about Biden rather than what Biden has actu­al­ly done.

Mean­while, vot­ers respond­ed favor­ably when asked about Don­ald Trump’s poli­cies, despite those poli­cies hav­ing been incred­i­bly destructive.

Per­cep­tion and real­i­ty have become extreme­ly dis­con­nect­ed. The mass media might not deserve all of the blame for that, but they cer­tain­ly deserve a lot.

“Amer­i­cans have heard the most about the Biden admin­is­tra­tion lowering
pre­scrip­tion drug costs, ramp­ing up clean ener­gy, and invest­ing in infrastructure,
but even on these accom­plish­ments, few­er than three in five Amer­i­cans have
heard about each one,” Nav­gia­tor report­ed last month.

“Com­mu­ni­cat­ing around Biden’s accom­plish­ments improves his net job approval
rat­ing by dou­ble dig­its, espe­cial­ly among peo­ple unfa­vor­able to both Biden and
Trump, younger Amer­i­cans, and col­lege-edu­cat­ed women.”

The key take­away: Once vot­ers learn about what Biden and Har­ris have got­ten done, they become more enthu­si­as­tic about sup­port­ing the tick­et in 2024.

Based on what has been pub­lished so far (most of the script was released, but not all of it) the New York Times and its research part­ners appar­ent­ly did­n’t test the pop­u­lar­i­ty of spe­cif­ic poli­cies and then revis­it the ques­tion of whether peo­ple feel Biden’s poli­cies have helped or hurt them. We would have been inter­est­ed in see­ing the effect of vot­ers learn­ing about Biden and Har­ris’ actu­al record.

Here’s anoth­er set of ques­tions and responses:

QUESTION: Do you think Joe Biden has the men­tal sharp­ness to be an effec­tive president?


  • Yes: 35%
  • No: 62%
  • Don’t know/Refused: 3%

QUESTION: Do you think Don­ald Trump has the men­tal sharp­ness to be an effec­tive president?


  • Yes: 54%
  • No: 44%
  • Don’t know/Refused: 2%

These are ridicu­lous yet actu­al­ly believ­able num­bers giv­en who’s in the sam­ple and con­sid­er­ing what pass­es for polit­i­cal cov­er­age in this country.

It’s also impor­tant to remem­ber that there’s an entire right wing media ecosys­tem in the Unit­ed States and beyond devot­ed to mak­ing Don­ald Trump look good and either ignor­ing or mak­ing excus­es for his un-Amer­i­can, fright­en­ing plat­form of fas­cism. It con­sists of Rupert Mur­doch’s FNC, AM right wing talk radio, pod­casts like the one Steve Ban­non puts out, and web­sites like Bre­it­bart and TownHall.

Biden and Har­ris, on the oth­er hand, don’t have a fawn­ing media appa­ra­tus at their dis­pos­al pro­duc­ing non­stop flat­ter­ing cov­er­age. The small pro­gres­sive media ecosys­tem that Amer­i­ca has does not cov­er Biden and Har­ris the way right wing media fawn­ing­ly and obe­di­ent­ly cov­ers Trump. On any giv­en day, a pro­gres­sive pub­li­ca­tion could be either crit­i­ciz­ing or prais­ing the admin­is­tra­tion — or per­haps even both, depend­ing on what the top­ics being cov­ered are.

For exam­ple, Biden’s deci­sion two years ago to renom­i­nate Jerome Pow­ell to be Fed Chair — a deci­sion that has result­ed in Amer­i­can mon­e­tary pol­i­cy remain­ing in the hands of a Don­ald Trump appointee with diver­gent pri­or­i­ties from those of Biden’s — was (jus­ti­fi­ably) crit­i­cized by many pro­gres­sive media outlets.

Don­ald Trump knows a lot about how the media oper­ates and con­stant­ly uses that knowl­edge to his advan­tage. Trump is at the same time both a per­son and a per­sona cre­at­ed and sus­tained by the mass media. Regard­less of your ide­l­og­i­cal views, you’ve like­ly noticed that Trump the per­son is able to stay stu­pid, false, and harm­ful things all of the time with­out Trump the per­sona tak­ing too many hits.

Any objec­tive analy­sis of what is known about Don­ald Trump, includ­ing reports from for­mer under­lings who observed him direct­ly, can’t sup­port the con­clu­sion that he has the men­tal sharp­ness to be an effec­tive pres­i­dent. Unlike eight years ago, when the pos­si­bil­i­ty of Trump in the Oval Office was still a hypo­thet­i­cal, we have a record of words and deeds to go on. It’s fright­en­ing­ly awful.

Yet, a major­i­ty of vot­ers in this research project think Trump has men­tal sharp­e­ness that Biden lacks. Repub­li­cans were over­sam­pled, but still.

Don’t let polls get you down: reframe if you want to be an effective activist, candidate, or leader who will help save American democracy from fascism in 2024

In Think­ing Points, a hand­book he wrote with the Rock­ridge Insti­tute, pro­gres­sive lin­guist George Lakoff made the impor­tant point that true lead­ers don’t fol­low polls. Rather, they lead peo­ple to new posi­tions, for that is what lead­er­ship is.

That time­less les­son is applic­a­ble here.

Sav­ing Amer­i­can democ­ra­cy from fas­cism in 2024 is achiev­able and worth doing. Any­one who wants to make a pos­i­tive con­tri­bu­tion to the cause must be will­ing to reframe and allo­cate what­ev­er they have to give wisely.

At NPI, we are fond of the max­im that fret­ting is like sit­ting in a rock­ing chair — it gives you some­thing to do, but it does­n’t get you anywhere.

Fig­ure out how to chan­nel any anx­i­ety you are feel­ing after see­ing these polls into some­thing use­ful, and you will have just under­tak­en a very worth­while exer­cise for next year. Prac­tice now so you can be the activist you want to be in 2024.

We have choic­es with respect to how we spend our time, our trea­sure, and our tal­ents. We are not required to think about the 2024 elec­tion using the deeply prob­lem­at­ic frames that the mass media use. We have the free­dom to reframe — and we must use that free­dom so that we can real­ize our col­lec­tive poten­tial in 2024. Refram­ing is the key to get­ting in gear for the pres­i­den­tial election.

If we lead, the cred­i­ble polling will even­tu­al­ly fol­low. The research, media, and mes­sag­ing we need are not going to mag­i­cal­ly appear of their own accord. We must build the nec­es­sary polit­i­cal infra­struc­ture to save Amer­i­can democ­ra­cy and not only deploy it for 2024, but keep it going beyond the elec­tion, for suc­cess will mean more elec­tions in the years to come.

We at NPI will keep doing our part, and we invite you to sup­port us. Make a one time dona­tion here or become a mem­ber — it will make a difference!

About the author

Andrew Villeneuve is the founder and executive director of the Northwest Progressive Institute, as well as the founder of NPI's sibling, the Northwest Progressive Foundation. He has worked to advance progressive causes for over two decades as a strategist, speaker, author, and organizer. Andrew is also a cybersecurity expert, a veteran facilitator, a delegate to the Washington State Democratic Central Committee, and a member of the Climate Reality Leadership Corps.

Adjacent posts

5 replies on “Poll Watch: Thoughts on the New York Times / Siena College’s battleground state polling”

  1. Yours is the ONLY email I’ve received from a pro­gres­sive out­let (and I sub­scribe to a bunch) that explains in basic terms what is going on in pol­i­tics. Thank you!

  2. Thank you for this as I went to the Siena web­site and read the poll ques­tions and answers and, as with all the polling out there, the sam­pling is too small, the ques­tions dif­fi­cult for the aver­age per­son to under­stand and answer and the process very labo­ri­ous. I have been polled twice by Ras­mussen on my land­line and found the time it took to go through each ques­tion in order to answer (how con­cerned are you about ille­gal immi­gra­tion at the south­ern bor­der 1 for extreme­ly, 2 for some­what, 3 for slight­ly and 4 for not at all..well, every­one is con­cerned about ille­gal any­thing there­fore the answers are always skewed to being con­cerned) is designed to sup­port a cer­tain point of view. Siena is a Catholic School with a ton of debt… does that influ­ence their right wing leanings?

  3. It would be help­ful if you pro­vid­ed bench­marks for what you believe a rep sam­ple would be ver­sus what was in the poll. I too ini­tial­ly ques­tioned the results, but I can­not pin­point where the bench­marks would be off to sug­gest over­sam­pling of Repub­li­cans (would be first time in his­to­ry a NYT poll over­sam­pled Republicans).

    What I do see in the data is that the 18–29 year-old vote thinks Biden is too old, rec­og­nizes Trump was more suc­cess­ful on the econ­o­my and for­eign police and essen­tial­ly wants to break Republican. 

    I also see 6–7% of the elec­torate poten­tial­ly stay­ing at home, which is not unheard of, a sim­i­lar % (I think 5%) stay­ing home is what doomed Hillary in 2016.

    Final­ly, the male-female gen­der gap still exists (favor­able for Democ­rats, a prob­lem for Repub­li­cans) but it is a much nar­row­er gap and with­in the range Repub­li­cans need it to be to win. 

    Tak­en togeth­er, those num­bers are not about Repub­li­can or Demo­c­rat — they are about Joe Biden and the eco­nom­ic pain that 18–29 year-olds have endured over the past 3 years and their prospects for the future.

    Just as Jim­my Carter stagfla­tion gave us young Repub­li­cans and Rea­gan con­ser­v­a­tives, the unique com­bi­na­tion of chaos and mis­ery that have been the Biden years may present a sim­i­lar opportunity.

    It is not clear from the poll that 18–29 year-olds will break for Trump, but it is clear they want to vote for a Republican.

    If I am a Demo­c­rat read­ing the poll, then it sug­gests that the same old play­book of going hard for abor­tion is the tick­et to rile up women, dri­ve up the gen­der gap, poten­tial­ly turnout vot­ers and win. 

    The risk in that is if you are still talk­ing about abor­tion in 2024 while vot­ers, par­tic­u­lar­ly those 18–29 who grew up in the small­est gen­er­a­tion in Amer­i­can his­to­ry and have real eco­nom­ic chal­lenges, have real prob­lems, you risk sound­ing tone deaf and not offer­ing solutions.

    Per­haps most trou­bling for Democ­rats is the fact that this poll sug­gests real cam­paign­ing will be need­ed by Biden to turn the tide and win the race. He was not men­tal­ly or phys­i­cal­ly capa­ble of that in 2020, why would he be able to do it in 2024?

  4. The prob­lem isn’t the sam­ple size, it’s the bias. And the ques­tions about what peo­ple believe about Biden and Trump show how bad this is. Trump nev­er had a 51% approval rat­ing while in office, but we’re sup­posed to believe he’s reached that lev­el now, even while he’s fac­ing mul­ti­ple pros­e­cu­tions around the country?

    Mean­while, in every spe­cial elec­tion in the past two years, the left has out­paced expec­ta­tions. It’s start­ing to feel like the poll­sters are try­ing to prop up the Republicans.

  5. To Bri­an S. — I would have had sev­er­al respons­es to your com­ments, which I was think­ing skewed pro-Repub­li­can, and then I got to your last sen­tence: “He [Biden] was not men­tal­ly or phys­i­cal­ly capa­ble of that [“win the race”] in 2020, why would he be able to do it in 2024?” You are aware that Biden did in fact win in 2020, aren’t you ? Or are you just an elec­tion denier ?

Comments are closed.