As recent­ly as a few weeks ago, it was­n’t hard to find some­one who had nev­er heard of Zoom Video Com­mu­ni­ca­tions (ZM), the web con­fer­enc­ing focused com­pa­ny found­ed in 2011 by for­mer Cis­co Webex engi­neer Eric Yuan.

Although Zoom has been build­ing a loy­al user base for years, and went pub­lic on the NASDAQ about a year ago with its ini­tial pub­lic offer­ing (IPO), it only became tru­ly ubiq­ui­tous with the advent of the nov­el coro­n­avirus pandemic.

Sud­den­ly, every­one was on Zoom. In one day alone last month, it was down­loaded 343,000 times. It’s been used for class­es, group meet­ings, doc­tor’s appoint­ments, birth­day par­ties, vir­tu­al fam­i­ly reunions, and every oth­er kind of gath­er­ing you can think of in addi­tion to work­place meet­ings and pre­sen­ta­tions. The com­pa­ny’s explo­sive growth has put it in the spotlight.

Over the past few weeks, jour­nal­ists and secu­ri­ty researchers have been sub­ject­ing the com­pa­ny and its ser­vice to increas­ing scruti­ny. They have col­lec­tive­ly demon­strat­ed that Zoom is a pri­va­cy and secu­ri­ty nightmare.

It turns out that Zoom’s encryp­tion is fake, the com­pa­ny’s long­stand­ing meet­ing defaults jeop­ar­dize user pri­va­cy, and the code in their apps has vulnerabilities.

And if that weren’t bad enough, Zoom has been send­ing users’ data to social media com­pa­nies for no defen­si­ble rea­son. Sur­veil­lance cap­i­tal­ism at its finest.

Let’s round up the many prob­lems that secu­ri­ty researchers and jour­nal­ists have doc­u­ment­ed with Zoom, shall we?

Zoom’s encryption is fake

Zoom claims to offer end-to-end encryp­tion, but it turns out that it doesn’t.

Here’s Bill Mar­czak and John Scott-Rail­ton of The Cit­i­zen Lab:

Unfor­tu­nate­ly for those hop­ing for pri­va­cy, the imple­men­ta­tion of call secu­ri­ty in Zoom may not match its excep­tion­al usabil­i­ty. We deter­mined that the Zoom app uses non-indus­try-stan­dard cryp­to­graph­ic tech­niques with iden­ti­fi­able weak­ness­es. In addi­tion, dur­ing mul­ti­ple test calls in North Amer­i­ca, we observed keys for encrypt­ing and decrypt­ing meet­ings trans­mit­ted to servers in Bei­jing, China.

An app with eas­i­ly-iden­ti­fi­able lim­i­ta­tions in cryp­tog­ra­phy, secu­ri­ty issues, and off­shore servers locat­ed in Chi­na which han­dle meet­ing keys presents a clear tar­get to rea­son­ably well-resourced nation state attack­ers, includ­ing the People’s Repub­lic of China.

Yikes!

Bill and John’s thor­ough­ly researched and impec­ca­bly doc­u­ment­ed report proves that Zoom does not actu­al­ly imple­ment end-to-end encryp­tion. It is thus whol­ly unsuit­able for any group that desires to avoid being spied on. Eaves­drop­ping on Zoom meet­ings is prob­a­bly triv­ial for intel­li­gence out­fits like the Unit­ed States’ Nation­al Secu­ri­ty Agency giv­en Zoom’s lack of real encryption.

The Inter­cept also pub­lished a report on this same sub­ject.

Zoom doesn’t properly protect users’ contact information

Moth­er­board found out that Zoom isn’t safe­guard­ing the con­tact infor­ma­tion of peo­ple who sign up with non-work email address­es. Joseph Cox explains:

Pop­u­lar video-con­fer­enc­ing Zoom is leak­ing per­son­al infor­ma­tion of at least thou­sands of users, includ­ing their email address and pho­to, and giv­ing strangers the abil­i­ty to attempt to start a video call with them through Zoom.

The issue lies in Zoom’s “Com­pa­ny Direc­to­ry” set­ting, which auto­mat­i­cal­ly adds oth­er peo­ple to a user’s lists of con­tacts if they signed up with an email address that shares the same domain. This can make it eas­i­er to find a spe­cif­ic col­league to call when the domain belongs to an indi­vid­ual company.

But mul­ti­ple Zoom users say they signed up with per­son­al email address­es, and Zoom pooled them togeth­er with thou­sands of oth­er peo­ple as if they all worked for the same com­pa­ny, expos­ing their per­son­al infor­ma­tion to one another.

This is an exam­ple of bad defaults and set­tings. Zoom was orig­i­nal­ly built for enter­prise and cor­po­rate video­con­fer­enc­ing, and in those con­texts, shar­ing by default isn’t a bad thing. But the com­pa­ny has known for some time now that its plat­form was being used for much more than enter­prise col­lab­o­ra­tion, and it did­n’t tight­en up its set­tings to pro­tect users’ privacy.

Zoom has been covertly sharing its users’ data externally

Moth­er­board also found out that Zoom’s iOS app was send­ing troves of user data to Face­book with­out its users’ knowl­edge or con­sent. Here’s Joseph Cox again:

As peo­ple work and social­ize from home, video con­fer­enc­ing soft­ware Zoom has explod­ed in popularity.

What the com­pa­ny and its pri­va­cy pol­i­cy don’t make clear is that the iOS ver­sion of the Zoom app is send­ing some ana­lyt­ics data to Face­book, even if Zoom users don’t have a Face­book account, accord­ing to a Moth­er­board analy­sis of the app.

This sort of data trans­fer is not uncom­mon, espe­cial­ly for Face­book; plen­ty of apps use Face­book’s soft­ware devel­op­ment kits (SDK) as a means to imple­ment fea­tures into their apps more eas­i­ly, which also has the effect of send­ing infor­ma­tion to Face­book. But Zoom users may not be aware it is hap­pen­ing, nor under­stand that when they use one prod­uct, they may be pro­vid­ing data to anoth­er ser­vice altogether.

“That’s shock­ing. There is noth­ing in the pri­va­cy pol­i­cy that address­es that,” Pat Wal­she, an activist from Pri­va­cy Mat­ters who has ana­lyzed Zoom’s pri­va­cy pol­i­cy, said in a Twit­ter direct message.

After the above arti­cle was pub­lished, Zoom removed the code from its iOS app that was feed­ing data to sur­veil­lance cap­i­tal­ism con­glom­er­ate Facebook.

Dis­grun­tled Zoom users wast­ed lit­tle time in fil­ing a class action law­suit.

And, with­in hours, The New York Times had pub­lished an arti­cle detail­ing how a Zoom inte­gra­tion with Microsoft-owned LinkedIn (which match­es Zoom user accounts to LinkedIn pro­files) could be uneth­i­cal­ly used for data min­ing pur­pos­es, unbe­knownst to peo­ple par­tic­i­pat­ing in meet­ings.

For Amer­i­cans shel­ter­ing at home dur­ing the coro­n­avirus pan­dem­ic, the Zoom video­con­fer­enc­ing plat­form has become a life­line, enabling mil­lions of peo­ple to eas­i­ly keep in touch with fam­i­ly mem­bers, friends, stu­dents, teach­ers and work colleagues.

But what many peo­ple may not know is that, until Thurs­day, a data-min­ing fea­ture on Zoom allowed some par­tic­i­pants to sur­rep­ti­tious­ly have access to LinkedIn pro­file data about oth­er users — with­out Zoom ask­ing for their per­mis­sion dur­ing the meet­ing or even noti­fy­ing them that some­one else was snoop­ing on them.

The undis­closed data min­ing adds to grow­ing con­cerns about Zoom’s busi­ness prac­tices at a moment when pub­lic schools, health providers, employ­ers, fit­ness train­ers, prime min­is­ters and queer dance par­ties are embrac­ing the platform.

An analy­sis by The New York Times found that when peo­ple signed in to a meet­ing, Zoom’s soft­ware auto­mat­i­cal­ly sent their names and email address­es to a com­pa­ny sys­tem it used to match them with their LinkedIn profiles.

Again Zoom was forced to respond. The com­pa­ny prompt­ly dis­abled the inte­gra­tion with LinkedIn Sales Nav­i­ga­tor and offered an apology.

Zoom’s old privacy policy allowed monetization

In the same vein, Con­sumer Reports took a look at Zoom’s pri­va­cy pol­i­cy and con­clud­ed it had been writ­ten to allow the com­pa­ny to tar­get users with adver­tis­ing based on analy­sis of the con­tent of their meet­ing videos.

Zoom’s pri­va­cy pol­i­cy allowed the com­pa­ny to col­lect infor­ma­tion from users’ meet­ings — from videos to tran­scripts to the notes you might have shared through Zoom’s chat feature.

The pri­va­cy pol­i­cy did­n’t pre­vent Zoom from using that per­son­al infor­ma­tion for tar­get­ing ads on or off the plat­form, or for oth­er busi­ness purposes.

After Con­sumer Reports pub­lished its find­ings, Zoom updat­ed its pol­i­cy. The com­pa­ny says the new pri­va­cy pol­i­cy aligns with its actu­al practices.

Zoom’s apps make your computer less safe

Last year, a secu­ri­ty researcher dis­cov­ered a big vul­ner­a­bil­i­ty in Zoom’s macOS app that left Zoom users shocked (and jus­ti­fi­ably so). Here’s Jonathan Leitschuh:

A vul­ner­a­bil­i­ty in the Mac Zoom Client allows any mali­cious web­site to enable your cam­era with­out your per­mis­sion. The flaw poten­tial­ly expos­es up to 750,000 com­pa­nies around the world that use Zoom to con­duct day-to-day business.

This vul­ner­a­bil­i­ty allows any web­site to forcibly join a user to a Zoom call, with their video cam­era acti­vat­ed, with­out the user’s permission.

On top of this, this vul­ner­a­bil­i­ty would have allowed any web­page to DOS (Denial of Ser­vice) a Mac by repeat­ed­ly join­ing a user to an invalid call.

Addi­tion­al­ly, if you’ve ever installed the Zoom client and then unin­stalled it, you still have a local­host web serv­er on your machine that will hap­pi­ly re-install the Zoom client for you, with­out requir­ing any user inter­ac­tion on your behalf besides vis­it­ing a web­page. This re-install ‘fea­ture’ con­tin­ues to work to this day.

The vul­ner­a­bil­i­ty was so egre­gious that Apple actu­al­ly pushed out a silent soft­ware update to remove the web serv­er that Zoom’s app had been qui­et­ly installing on peo­ple’s Macs with­out their knowledge.

Leitschuh turned down a bug boun­ty from Zoom Video Com­mu­ni­ca­tions in order to avoid sign­ing a nondis­clo­sure agree­ment (NDA) that would have pre­vent­ed him from telling the world about what Zoom had done.

More recent­ly, anoth­er secu­ri­ty researcher — Felix Seele of VMRay — doc­u­ment­ed how Zoom’s installer mim­ics mal­ware in order to reduce the amount of user inter­ven­tion required to install it. His blog post attract­ed the atten­tion of Zoom’s founder and CEO Eric Yuan, who con­ced­ed that well, gosh, maybe Zoom’s app should­n’t behave that way. It also caught the atten­tion of many journalists.

What about Win­dows users?

Zoom put them at risk, too.

Wang Wei:

Accord­ing to cyber­se­cu­ri­ty expert @_g0dmode, the Zoom video con­fer­enc­ing soft­ware for Win­dows is vul­ner­a­ble to a clas­sic ‘UNC path injec­tion’ vul­ner­a­bil­i­ty that could allow remote attack­ers to steal vic­tims’ Win­dows login cre­den­tials and even exe­cute arbi­trary com­mands on their systems.

Such attacks are pos­si­ble because Zoom for Win­dows sup­ports remote UNC paths that con­vert poten­tial­ly inse­cure URIs into hyper­links when received via chat mes­sages to a recip­i­ent in a per­son­al or group chat.

Bleep­ing Com­put­er has more.

Zoom’s defaults make “Zoombombing” disturbingly easy

Zoom was orig­i­nal­ly con­ceived as a work­place col­lab­o­ra­tion tool, not as a uni­ver­sal elec­tron­ic meet­ing venue for fam­i­lies, com­mu­ni­ty groups, advo­ca­cy orga­ni­za­tions, or health­care providers. The com­pa­ny has his­tor­i­cal­ly pri­va­tized ease-of-use above all else. That has left Zoom users — par­tic­u­lar­ly those new to the plat­form — in a very vul­ner­a­ble posi­tion.

As you may have already heard or read, Zoom’s meet­ing defaults make it pret­ty easy to barge into a meet­ing and begin caus­ing mayhem.

Zoom meet­ing IDs can be guessed, which means meet­ings can be crashed even if hosts take great care not to pub­licly adver­tise an e‑gathering.

And, of course, meet­ings that are pub­licly adver­tised are triv­ial to disrupt.

Groups of imma­ture mis­chief mak­ers have even formed on social media plat­forms and mes­sage boards for the explic­it pur­pose of derail­ing Zoom meet­ings.

A com­mon “Zoom­bomb­ing” tech­nique involves enter­ing a meet­ing and using the screen-shar­ing func­tion­al­i­ty (which can be restrict­ed to hosts, but often isn’t) to share porno­graph­ic, sex­u­al­ly explic­it images and videos.

Expe­ri­enced “Zoom­bombers” know how to reen­ter meet­ings after being kicked off so that they can con­tin­ue to cause may­hem — at least, until the host decides to end the meet­ing after hav­ing lost con­trol of it.

Tools have also been devel­oped to allow peo­ple up to no good to find meet­ings to crash with­out much effort. Bri­an Krebs wrote about one such tool.

“Zoom­bomb­ing” is not good clean fun, as some juve­nile Inter­net trolls appear to believe. Law enforce­ment offi­cials have begun to speak out and warn that those who dis­rupt Zoom meet­ings could face crim­i­nal pros­e­cu­tion.

Giv­en that Zoom is nei­ther pri­vate or secure, peo­ple engag­ing in “Zoom­bomb­ing” could eas­i­ly find them­selves on the wrong end of the law.

“Zoom­bomb­ing” is large­ly pre­ventable, but not using Zoom’s old default settings.

Zoom’s response to all of this

To address reports of “Zoom­bomb­ing”, the com­pa­ny ini­tial­ly pub­lished a guide for its users so they could learn how to change their account and meet­ing set­tings to pro­tect them­selves, their fam­i­ly, friends, stu­dents, and colleagues.

When that proved to be insuf­fi­cient, Zoom began invert­ing some of its defaults so that hosts would­n’t have to make those changes themselves.

“On April 4th, 2020, Zoom will enable the Wait­ing Room fea­ture and require addi­tion­al pass­word set­tings for all Basic users on free accounts and accounts with a sin­gle licensed user, includ­ing K‑12 edu­ca­tion accounts who have the forty-minute lim­it tem­porar­i­ly waived. The new pass­word require­ments apply to both meet­ings and webi­na­rs,” the com­pa­ny announced last week.

It is not lost on Zoom’s exec­u­tives that good­will is a valu­able, intan­gi­ble asset, and they’re los­ing it fast. Many com­pa­nies and pub­lic agen­cies have already banned Zoom’s use, includ­ing the Unit­ed King­dom’s Min­istry of Defence, SpaceX, NASA, New York City Depart­ment of Edu­ca­tion, and Clark Coun­ty Schools.

Zoom CEO Eric Yuan is pledg­ing to do bet­ter. In an April 2nd blog post, he detailed how the com­pa­ny has scram­bled to respond to all the pri­va­cy and secu­ri­ty issues that researchers and jour­nal­ists have exposed in its platform.

He also promised that Zoom would become more secure and private.

Over the next nine­ty days, we are com­mit­ted to ded­i­cat­ing the resources need­ed to bet­ter iden­ti­fy, address, and fix issues proac­tive­ly. We are also com­mit­ted to being trans­par­ent through­out this process. We want to do what it takes to main­tain your trust.

This includes:

• Enact­ing a fea­ture freeze, effec­tive­ly imme­di­ate­ly, and shift­ing all our engi­neer­ing resources to focus on our biggest trust, safe­ty, and pri­va­cy issues.
• Con­duct­ing a com­pre­hen­sive review with third-par­ty experts and rep­re­sen­ta­tive users to under­stand and ensure the secu­ri­ty of all of our new con­sumer use cases.
• Prepar­ing a trans­paren­cy report that details infor­ma­tion relat­ed to requests for data, records, or content.
• Enhanc­ing our cur­rent bug boun­ty program.
• Launch­ing a CISO coun­cil in part­ner­ship with lead­ing CISOs from across the indus­try to facil­i­tate an ongo­ing dia­logue regard­ing secu­ri­ty and pri­va­cy best practices.
• Engag­ing a series of simul­ta­ne­ous white box pen­e­tra­tion tests to fur­ther iden­ti­fy and address issues.
• Start­ing next week, I will host a week­ly webi­nar on Wednes­days at 10 AM Pacif­ic Time to pro­vide pri­va­cy and secu­ri­ty updates to our community.

This seems like a good start.

But Zoom can and should do more.

Our friends at Fight For The Future have begun a cam­paign call­ing on Zoom to imple­ment true end-to-end encryp­tion so that its users can enjoy the pri­va­cy that Zoom has been false­ly claim­ing to offer all this time. Said Evan Greer:

We don’t need Zoom’s apolo­gies. We need them to actu­al­ly imple­ment the type of secu­ri­ty mea­sures need­ed to keep peo­ple safe. They’ve said that they are piv­ot­ing to focus on user pri­va­cy and secu­ri­ty, and I want to believe them. It’s time for them to take their pre­vi­ous­ly mis­lead­ing claims and make them true.

Zoom imple­ment­ing end-to-end encryp­tion by default is per­haps the sin­gle biggest thing that any com­pa­ny could do right now to pro­tect people’s online safe­ty dur­ing the COVID-19 crisis.

I hope the engi­neers who work there real­ize the pow­er that they have and the impor­tance of the deci­sions they make over the next sev­er­al weeks. Strong encryp­tion saves lives.

It’s need­ed now more than ever. Zoom has a chance to lead the way. I hope, for the sake of the chil­dren using this for school, the ther­a­pists using this to treat patients, the health offi­cials using this to share con­fi­den­tial infor­ma­tion, that they do the right thing.

We agree. Zoom is wide­ly used (includ­ing by our staff and board at NPI) in large part because it “just works”. Unlike com­peti­tors, Zoom offers apps for users on GNU/Linux desk­tops and lap­tops run­ning Ubun­tu or oth­er dis­tri­b­u­tions. Even its Black­Ber­ry 10 app still works, allow­ing peo­ple who refuse to give up their Black­Ber­rys (like me) to use Zoom with­out hav­ing to switch to anoth­er device.

Zoom’s video qual­i­ty, app inter­face, and advanced screen shar­ing and audi­ence inter­ac­tion capa­bil­i­ties are also part of the ser­vice’s appeal.

But Zoom’s pri­va­cy and secu­ri­ty track record is more than unset­tling. It’s alarm­ing. The com­pa­ny has dug itself into a deep hole by mak­ing a lot of bad prod­uct design deci­sions and mak­ing decep­tive mar­ket­ing claims.

It now needs to piv­ot towards being a pri­va­cy and secu­ri­ty ori­ent­ed ser­vice. The com­pa­ny already has mil­lions of peo­ple and firms signed up as pay­ing sub­scribers to its pro plans, so it has a means of gen­er­at­ing rev­enue that does­n’t depend on sur­veil­lance cap­i­tal­ism (where the users are the product).

It appears that Zoom is head­ing down the right path. That’s encour­ag­ing. But actions speak loud­er than words. The proof will be in the pud­ding. Zoom needs to deliv­er for its users, and soon. It needs to go beyond the steps announced by its CEO. More meet­ing defaults and shar­ing set­tings need to be changed, par­tic­u­lar­ly for accounts on Zoom’s free tier, which are less like­ly to be enter­prise users.

And most impor­tant­ly of all, Zoom needs to deliv­er real end-to-end encryp­tion for its users. That might require some hard work on Zoom’s part.

But it will be worth it. The com­pa­ny must enlist the help of lead­ing secu­ri­ty researchers and tech­nol­o­gists to get the job done. If it can do that, then it will be able to win back a lot of the trust that it has jeop­ar­dized or squandered.